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Abstract 
 
Citizens are politically autonomous insofar as they are subject to laws that are (a) justified by 
reasons acceptable to them and (b) authorized by them via their political institutions. An 
obstacle to the equal realization of political autonomy is the plurality of religious, moral, and 
philosophical views endorsed by citizens. Decisions regarding certain fundamental political 
issues (e.g., abortion) can involve citizens imposing political positions justified in terms of 
their respective worldviews upon others. Despite citizens’ disagreements over which 
worldview is correct, ‘political liberalism’ claims that there is a form of political autonomy 
that is realizable within pluralist societies. (Political liberalism differs from ‘comprehensive 
liberalism’ by, inter alia, being ‘freestanding’ vis-à-vis citizens’ different worldviews.) Citizens 
can be politically autonomous if they enjoy equal political power and justify its exercise with 
‘public reasons.’ A political liberal education would aim at ensuring that all students can 
become politically autonomous citizens by teaching them how to exercise their democratic 
rights effectively and how to engage in public reasoning. Some political and educational 
theorists, however, argue that teaching students how to be politically autonomous amounts 
to teaching them how to be ‘comprehensively’ autonomous. If this is so, then the distinction 
between political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism collapses, at least with respect to 
education. This chapter outlines the main elements of political liberalism, summarizes the 
main requirements of a political liberal citizenship education, and surveys three arguments in 
support of and against the thesis that a political liberal education amounts to an education 
for comprehensive autonomy. 
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Introduction  
 
Within a legitimate political society, Jean-Jacques Rousseau contends, “the words ‘subject’ 
and ‘sovereign’ are identical correlatives, the meaning of which is brought together in the 
single word ‘citizen’” (Rousseau 1968: 138). Rousseauian citizens possess what later 
philosophers refer to as ‘political autonomy’ (e.g., Rawls 2005). Leaving aside the 
idiosyncrasies of Rousseau’s account, the general idea of political autonomy is that citizens 
are politically autonomous insofar as they are subject to laws that are justified by reasons that 
are acceptable to them and are authorized by them via their political institutions. 
 
An obstacle to the realization of political autonomy within contemporary liberal democratic 
societies is the plurality of religious, moral, and philosophical views endorsed by citizens (e.g., 
Buddhism and utilitarianism). This pluralism cannot be eliminated without the exercise of 
politically oppressive power, something that liberalism’s commitment to toleration rules out. 
Yet accommodating this pluralism seems to prevent the realization of all citizens’ political 
autonomy. This is because decisions regarding certain fundamental political issues—for 
instance, what the laws should be concerning abortion or physician-assisted suicide—can 
involve citizens imposing political positions justified in terms of their respective worldviews 
upon others. If this is so, then not all citizens can be politically autonomous: many will be 
subject to laws that are justified by reasons that they cannot accept. 
  
Despite citizens’ disagreements over which worldview is correct, ‘political liberalism’—the 
account of legitimacy and justice developed most famously by John Rawls (2001, 2005)—
claims that there is a form of political autonomy that is realizable within pluralist societies. 
Citizens can be politically autonomous if they enjoy (roughly) equal political power and 
justify the exercise of that power vis-à-vis fundamental political matters with ‘public reasons.’ 
A political liberal educational system would aim at ensuring that all students become 
politically autonomous citizens. Educationally, this would involve teaching students how to 
exercise their democratic rights effectively and how to engage in public reasoning. 
 
Can students be taught to be politically autonomous without teachers and schools also 
cultivating within them a ‘comprehensive’ form of autonomy, that is, a form of autonomy 
that encompasses not simply political matters but all or most dimensions of persons’ lives? If 
not, then political autonomy may not be achievable for many citizens after all. This is 
because comprehensive autonomy is an ideal that many citizens reject (for instance, those 
who endorse certain kinds of religious views). Such citizens will find it difficult if not 
impossible to support an educational system that inculcates or promotes that ideal in their 
children. If teaching political autonomy necessarily involves teaching comprehensive 
autonomy, then political liberalism’s accommodation of pluralism may be quite limited. 
 
This chapter surveys the debate concerning political liberalism, autonomy, and education. 
The focus will be on Rawlsian political liberalism. (Similar versions of political liberalism are 
presented in: Cohen 1999, 2008; Larmore 1987, 2008; Nussbaum 2011; Quong 2011; and 
Watson and Hartley 2018.) The core elements of political liberalism are outlined in §I. The 
main requirements of a political liberal citizenship education are summarized in §II. Three 
arguments that such an education amounts to an education for comprehensive autonomy are 
considered in §III, along with replies to those arguments. Concluding remarks are in §IV. 
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I. Political liberalism 
 
I.a. Reasonable pluralism 
 
A central claim of political liberalism is that citizens living in societies that respect basic 
liberal rights, including liberty of conscience, invariably will subscribe to a range of 
incompatible philosophical, moral, and religious “comprehensive doctrines” (e.g., Islam, 
secular humanism, etc.). Such doctrines apply to most or all aspects of persons’ lives. Rawls 
calls this the “fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 2005: 36f, 441). This pluralism can be 
eliminated only through the exercise of political oppression (Rawls 2005: 37). 
 
I.b. A political conception of justice 
 
In order to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism while respecting citizens’ equal 
standing, Rawls holds that society should be organized by a ‘political conception of justice.’ 
Such a conception satisfies what may be called the ‘basic structure restriction’ and the 
‘freestanding condition.’ According to the basic structure restriction, a political conception 
of justice applies directly only to society’s ‘basic structure’: its main political and economic 
institutions, understood as an overall system of cooperation encompassing all citizens. 
‘Voluntary associations’ like religious institutions may organize themselves internally in other 
ways—their governance, for instance, need not be democratic—but they cannot violate the 
rights of citizens that are secured by the basic structure, including those of their members. A 
political conception of justice satisfies the freestanding condition by being formulated in 
terms of distinctly ‘political’ ideas (concepts, principles, ideals, and values). Such political 
ideas do not presuppose the truth of any particular comprehensive doctrine. Instead, they 
are construed as implicit within the public political culture of democratic society, namely, the 
conceptions of citizens as free and equal, and society as a fair system of cooperation. Hence 
a political conception of justice is compatible with (and ideally integrated into) the different 
comprehensive doctrines endorsed by citizens (Rawls 2005: 11–16, 374–76). A 
‘comprehensive’ conception of justice, in contrast, is based upon a particular comprehensive 
doctrine (say, utilitarianism) and/or applies directly to areas of life beyond the basic structure.  
 
Consider the conception of justice that Rawls defends as the most reasonable one: ‘justice as 
fairness.’ This conception consists of two principles, the first of which enjoys ‘lexical priority’ 
over the second (Rawls, 1999: 132, 266–267, 2001: 46–47). The first principle secures a set 
of ‘basic liberties’—freedom of association, the political liberties, and so forth—equally for 
all citizens. The second principle consists of two sub-principles: (a) the ‘fair equality of 
opportunity’ principle, which regulates the distribution of unequal positions of authority, 
wealth, and income, and (b) the ‘difference principle’, which concerns (inter alia) society’s 
overall distribution of income and wealth. (See Rawls 2001: 42-43.) An account of the 
stability of a society that complies with these principles is advanced in Part III of A Theory of 
Justice (Rawls 1999/1971). This account, however, violates the freestanding condition: it 
presupposes elements of a comprehensive doctrine. Hence it is a (partially) comprehensive 
conception of justice (Rawls 2001: 186-87; see also Weithman 2010). In contrast, the revised 
version of justice as fairness is a political conception, as its account of stability satisfies the 
freestanding condition (see Rawls 2001: Part V; 2005: Lecture IV). 
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I.c. Citizens as reasonable persons 
 
A core idea of political liberalism is that of citizens as capable of being reasonable persons. 
Reasonable persons acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism and share a commitment 
to satisfying what Rawls calls the “criterion of reciprocity” when justifying fundamental 
political decisions to one another (Rawls 2005: xliv, 16, 49–50, 54). The criterion of 
reciprocity is the “intrinsic (moral) political ideal” of political liberalism (Rawls 2005, xlv). In 
order to satisfy this criterion, citizens must justify their proposals concerning “constitutional 
essentials” and “matters of basic justice” (Rawls 2005: 214-15, 227-30, 235) in terms that 
other citizens—or at least those similarly committed to the criterion of reciprocity (see Lister 
2018)—find acceptable. The reasonableness of persons expresses itself in what Rawls calls 
the first “moral power” of citizens: their capacity to form and act upon a “sense of justice” 
(Rawls 2001: 18-19, 196).  
 
I.d. Civic respect and public reason 
 
One way to understand how citizens can be reasonable persons is to see reasonableness as 
involving a form of mutual respect (see Edenberg 2016). Given its political context, this 
conception of mutual respect can be termed ‘civic respect’ (Neufeld 2005, 2019). Civic 
respect has four features:  
 
1. Civic respect requires that citizens acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
2. Civic respect is a form of ‘recognition respect’ (Darwall 1995, 2006). Recognition 
respect, roughly, is that respect which is owed to persons in virtue of some 
characteristic that they possess. This characteristic grants such persons a certain 
standing in their relations with others. Civic respect is the form of recognition 
respect that is owed to persons in virtue of their standing as free and equal 
citizens. One expresses such respect by taking this standing into account when 
deciding fundamental political questions in concert with one’s fellow citizens.  
3. Because civic respect is owed to persons qua citizens, it is limited in its scope to 
relations among citizens within the basic structure of society.  
4. Civic respect requires that citizens decide questions regarding constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice in a way that satisfies the criterion of 
reciprocity—that is, given the first three features of civic respect, in accordance 
with the idea of ‘public reason.’ 
 
‘Public reasoning’ is the form of reasoning that Rawls maintains citizens should use when 
deciding fundamental political questions. The idea of public reason should be understood as 
“part of the idea of democracy itself” (Rawls 2005: 441). The terms of public reason—
particular ‘public reasons’—are provided by the family of ‘reasonable’ political conceptions 
of justice endorsed by citizens. A ‘reasonable’ political conception of justice is one that, in 
addition to satisfying the freestanding condition and the basic structure restriction, also 
satisfies the criterion of reciprocity. In order to satisfy this criterion, that conception must 
give priority to securing the basic rights and liberties of democratic citizenship equally for all, 
and, moreover, ensure that all citizens have adequate resources to exercise effectively those 
rights and liberties over the course of their lives (Rawls 2005: 450). Rawls holds that justice 
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as fairness is “the most reasonable conception because it best satisfies these conditions” 
(Rawls 2005: xlvi). Public reasons also may include the methods and conclusions of 
transparent forms of inquiry (such as those of logic and the sciences). 
 
Decisions concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice made via public 
reasoning satisfy the “liberal principle of legitimacy” (Rawls 2005: xliv, 137). Such decisions 
have normative authority for citizens (Rawls 2005: 19). This is because the public reasons 
that are used to justify those decisions are acceptable to all reasonable citizens. 
 
I.e. The duty of civility and the public political forum 
 
When citizens use public reasons to decide fundamental political questions, they realize what 
Rawls calls their “duty of civility” (Rawls 2005: 444). This duty applies primarily to public 
officials within the ‘public political forum.’ This forum is where national political issues are 
debated and authoritative decisions regarding them are made. It consists of three parts: “the 
discourse of judges in their decisions, especially of the judges of a supreme court; the 
discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and legislators; and […] the 
discourse of candidates for public office” (Rawls 2005: 443). Other citizens, however, are 
not exempt from the duty of civility: they fulfill it by holding public officials to the idea of 
public reason when evaluating their performance within the public political forum, especially 
(though not exclusively) when voting (Rawls 2005: 444-445).  
 
Political debates need not employ public reasons alone. Reasons drawn from particular 
comprehensive doctrines can be introduced in the public political forum, so long as what 
Rawls calls ‘the proviso’ is satisfied. The proviso is satisfied if “proper political reasons—and 
not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines—are presented that are sufficient to 
support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support” (Rawls 2005, 
462). For instance, a utilitarian legislator could explain her support for a law permitting 
physician-assisted suicide on utilitarian grounds (arguing, roughly, that such a law would 
maximize overall utility), so long as she also provided a justification in terms of public 
reasons (say, that the law in question best respects citizens’ equal freedom to control their 
own lives). Moreover, political debates outside of the public political forum—discussions 
within civil society, what Rawls calls the ‘background culture’—need not use public reasons 
(Rawls 2005: 442–443). Nonetheless, the duty of civility requires sufficient public reason 
justifications for all decisions concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. 
 
I.f. Citizens as rational persons 
 
Citizens also are characterized in political liberalism as capable of being rational persons. 
Citizens’ rational nature includes what Rawls refers to as their second moral power: the 
capacity to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good. A conception of the good “is 
an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies a person’s conception of what is of 
value in human life or, alternatively, of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life” (Rawls 
2001: 19). Rational persons determine for themselves what kinds of lives have value, and 
they pursue or revise their life-plans in accordance with those determinations over time. 
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I.g. Citizens’ higher-order interests 
 
Citizens’ opportunities to exercise effectively their two moral powers—their capacities to 
form and act upon conceptions of justice and the good—over the course of their lives 
constitute their “higher-order interests” (Rawls 2005: 74–75, 106). Moreover, citizens’ 
reasonable nature, their sense of justice, constrains their rational pursuit of their conceptions 
of the good. (For more on the reasonable and the rational, see Rawls 2001: 6-7, 81-82, 191.)  
 
This conception of citizens, Rawls stresses, “is meant as both normative and political, not 
metaphysical or psychological” (Rawls 2001: 19). It is an ideal that most persons with 
adequate education and resources are capable of realizing in their lives (at least well enough to 
be considered equal citizens). Reasonable political conceptions of justice are formulated with 
reference to this conception of citizens: principles of justice are those that citizens can 
support freely given their higher-order interests (their interests in being able to exercise the 
moral powers). This normative political conception of citizens, moreover, is freestanding in 
nature, and hence compatible with different comprehensive doctrines. 
 
I.h. Full political autonomy 
 
When citizens are committed to interacting with one another on the basis of civic respect it 
is possible for them all to enjoy and exercise ‘full political autonomy.’ There are two 
elements to citizens’ full political autonomy, what can be termed ‘institutional autonomy’ and 
‘justificatory autonomy.’  
 
Institutionally autonomous citizens possess the rights and resources that enable them to take 
part as (roughly) equal contributors to their society’s main decision-making processes. 
Citizens exercise institutional autonomy “by participating in society’s public affairs and 
sharing in its collective self-determination over time” (Rawls 2005: 78). Hence the equal 
political liberties—including the rights to vote and run for public office—must be part of 
any reasonable political conception of justice. 
 
Citizens enjoy justificatory autonomy when fundamental political decisions are made using 
reasons that they find acceptable (Rawls 2005: 77). Public reasoning makes possible citizens’ 
justificatory autonomy despite the fact of reasonable pluralism. But although public reasons 
are acceptable to all, citizens may reach different conclusions concerning particular political 
questions. It is to be expected that individuals will give different weights to different public 
reasons and, moreover, interpret them in somewhat different ways. As Rawls says, “this is 
the normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected” (Rawls 2005: 479). Even when 
they disagree over which political positions are the most reasonable, though, citizens possess 
justificatory autonomy insofar as the positions selected are supported by public reasons.  
 
Public reasoning, then, “is the form of reasoning appropriate to equal citizens who as a 
corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power” (Rawls 
2001: 92). Such citizens are simultaneously ‘subjects’ and ‘sovereigns.’ They are politically 
autonomous by exercising their political liberties to help decide fundamental political 
decisions via public reasons (see Rawls 2005: xliv; for discussion see: Neufeld 2019; Watson 
and Hartley 2018; and Weithman 2011, 2017, 2018). 
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II. Political liberal citizenship education 
 
II.a. Educating students to become reasonable and rational persons 
 
A political liberal education for citizenship would teach students the skills, concepts, and 
virtues necessary for them to become capable of being reasonable and rational persons as 
adults. Teaching students how to be rational persons would involve ensuring that they know 
how to use their rights and resources to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good. 
Cultivating reasonableness in students would involve teaching them how to interact with 
others on the basis of civic respect. Students consequently would learn how to be fully 
politically autonomous and respect the political autonomy of others. This is because they 
would learn how to exercise their democratic rights effectively (institutional autonomy) and 
how to justify to others their positions regarding fundamental political matters with public 
reasons (justificatory autonomy). 
 
II.b. Political versus comprehensive autonomy 
 
Rawls distinguishes between political autonomy and comprehensive autonomy—the latter 
often also is referred to as ‘ethical’ autonomy (the terms ‘ethical autonomy’ and 
‘comprehensive autonomy’ will be used interchangeably hereinafter). Comprehensive 
autonomy (inter alia) applies to the whole (or most aspects) of persons’ lives. While political 
liberalism “affirms political autonomy for all,” Rawls claims that it “leaves the weight of 
ethical autonomy to be decided by citizens severally in light of their comprehensive doctrines” 
(Rawls 2005, 78). Democratic citizens are to help to determine the laws to which they all are 
subject; whether to value and exercise autonomy in the other dimensions of their lives is to be 
left to them. 
 
Does this distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy have educational 
implications? Rawls thinks that it does. In Political Liberalism he briefly considers the scope of 
the “requirements the state can impose” on the education of children belonging to “religious 
sects [that] oppose the culture of the modern world and wish to lead their common life apart 
from its unwanted influences.” Comprehensive liberal approaches to education, Rawls 
explains, “may lead to requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy and 
individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life.” By contrast, “political liberalism has 
a different aim and requires far less” (Rawls, 2005, 199). Because it aims only at political 
autonomy, which is limited in its scope to society’s political decision-making processes (see 
§I.h), Rawls holds that a political liberal educational system can accommodate the beliefs and 
practices of the members of the religious sects in question. 
 
II.c. Comprehensive autonomy: substantive autonomy 
 
Before considering the relation between political and comprehensive autonomy, a clearer 
understanding of what the latter involves is needed. There are many ‘conceptions’ of the 
‘concept’ of autonomy—Rawlsian political autonomy is an example of a particular 
conception. (On the distinction between ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions,’ see Rawls 1999: 5; for 
discussion of this distinction with respect to autonomy, see Dworkin 1988: 9-10.) Which 
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conception (or family of conceptions) does Rawls have in mind when he distinguishes 
ethical autonomy from his conception of political autonomy? 
 
When he refers to ethical autonomy, Rawls seems to have in mind something like what 
Gerald Dworkin calls ‘substantive’ autonomy (Dworkin 1988; see also the discussion of 
‘autonomy’ in Benn 1988). A life lived autonomously, in this sense, requires that persons 
critically reflect on their deepest ends and beliefs, and display a kind of ‘independence’ by 
not deferring (at least not usually) to others, including authorities (e.g., religious or 
community leaders), on such questions. Substantive ethical autonomy also may involve a 
willingness to explore, or at least seriously consider, alternative ways of life (projects, life-
plans, and the like). According to Rawls, citizens can be politically autonomous even if they 
are not substantively (ethically) autonomous (say, by accepting their religious views on the 
basis of faith and community, and not through independent rational reflection). 
 
III. Political and comprehensive autonomy: for and against the convergence thesis 
 
Some political liberals defend Rawls’s claim that an education for political autonomy differs 
from, and is generally less demanding than, one for comprehensive autonomy (Davis and 
Neufeld 2007; De Wijze 1999; Ebels-Duggan 2013; Neufeld 2013). This position, though, 
has been challenged by a number of theorists who have written on this topic. Some political 
liberals maintain that political liberalism requires a form of education for citizenship that is 
much more demanding than that suggested by Rawls (Costa 2011; Macedo 2000; Schouten 
2018). And some comprehensive liberals contend that teaching Rawlsian political autonomy 
amounts to teaching comprehensive autonomy (Callan 1996, 1997; Gutmann 1995; 
Kymlicka 2001: Chap.17). This section presents three arguments in support of the claim that 
an education for political autonomy ‘converges’ with an education for comprehensive 
autonomy—hereinafter referred to as the ‘convergence thesis’—as well as some replies to 
those arguments.   
 
III.a. The first moral power argument for the convergence thesis 
 
The first kind of argument in support of the convergence thesis focuses on the educational 
goal of creating reasonable citizens, specifically, the goal of ensuring that students acquire, 
and learn how to exercise effectively, a sense of justice (the first moral power). This 
requirement involves ensuring that students know how to engage in the public life of their 
society in order to promote the political values and principles of justice that they judge to be 
the most reasonable. According to some defenders of the convergence thesis, the goal of 
teaching students how to be effective democratic citizens amounts to teaching them how to 
be comprehensively autonomous, even if this is not the explicit goal of such an education. 
 
Amy Gutmann, writing from a comprehensive liberal perspective, maintains that despite the 
theoretical soundness of Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy, 
there is no practical difference between them, at least when it comes to educating future 
citizens. This is because, according to Gutmann, “most (if not all) of the same skills and 
virtues that are necessary and sufficient for educating children for citizenship in a liberal 
democracy are those that are also necessary and sufficient for educating children to 
deliberate about their way of life, more generally (and less politically) speaking” (Gutmann 
1995: 573). In practice at least, teaching citizens to become politically autonomous amounts 
Page 9 of 16 
to teaching them to be comprehensively autonomous. (See also Kymlicka 2001 and Reich 
2002: ch.2.) (Gutmann (1995) also advances an argument in support of the convergence 
thesis based on a shared commitment among political and comprehensive liberals to 
teaching mutual respect to students. Davis and Neufeld (2007: 53-60) contend that Gutmann’s 
argument fails because the conception of civic respect (see §I.d) differs from—and has less 
demanding educational requirements than—the comprehensive liberal conception of mutual 
respect endorsed by Gutmann.)  
 
Gutmann’s argument for the convergence thesis finds indirect support in the account of 
citizenship education advanced by the political liberal Stephen Macedo. Macedo calls his 
version of political liberalism ‘civic liberalism’ and holds that it is committed to a 
‘transformative project’: liberal institutions must “mold people in a manner that ensures that 
liberal freedom is what they want” (Macedo 2000: 15, Macedo’s italics). Furthermore, 
Macedo defends what he calls ‘civic autonomy,’ according to which students are “provided 
with the intellectual tools necessary to […] formulate their own convictions, and make their 
own way in life” (238). “[P]romoting […] core liberal values,” Macedo writes, “will probably 
have the effect of encouraging critical thinking in general.” Consequently, “Liberal civic 
virtues and attitudes will spill over into other spheres of life”; indeed, a liberal society’s 
institutions and practices must “work to transform the whole of the moral world in the 
image our most basic political values” (Macedo 2000: 179, 151).  
 
Macedo characterizes civic liberalism as a form of political liberalism by appealing primarily 
to the freestanding condition (Macedo 2000: 166-174). The basic structure restriction, in 
contrast, does not seem to be part of civic liberalism. Macedo claims that the liberal 
distinction between public and private life is only “superficial” in nature: “In a deeper sense,” 
he maintains, “liberal institutions and practices shape all of our deepest moral commitments” 
(164). Hence while “[p]ublic educational institutions should not promote comprehensive 
ideals of life as a whole […] that does not mean that public schools are limited to a narrowly 
political agenda.” This is because, according to civic liberalism, “Our civic ideals are not 
narrowly political” (239). Consequently, the requirements of a civic liberal citizenship 
education include promoting in students a capacity for civic autonomy and a willingness to 
exercise that capacity in most if not all domains of social life. Macedo, then, ultimately seems 
to concur with Gutmann that political and comprehensive liberals converge (for the most 
part) on the same demanding account of citizenship education, differing only in their distinct 
rationales for that account. 
 
Both Macedo and Gutmann, in short, hold that teaching students how to be effective 
democratic citizens—how to exercise their first moral power—involve teaching skills and 
concepts that invariably spill over into other areas of students’ lives, thereby teaching them a 
comprehensive form of autonomy. 
 
III.b. Against the first moral power argument 
 
Those who defend the distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy do not 
deny that teaching students to become politically autonomous might lead some (perhaps 
many) to come to value and exercise a more comprehensive form of autonomy (Rawls 2005, 
199-200). Nonetheless, they maintain that the kinds of spill-over effects described by 
Gutmann and Macedo do not demonstrate that teaching political autonomy and teaching 
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ethical autonomy are indistinguishable in practice. Davis and Neufeld hold that convergence in 
educational practice is nether conceptually nor practically inevitable—there exists a ‘gap,’ in 
both theory and practice, between teaching students the political ideas necessary for free and 
equal citizenship, and teaching students a form of comprehensive autonomy (Davis and 
Neufeld 2007: 60, n.41; Neufeld 2013). Classes that aim to teach students how to be 
politically autonomous, roughly, teach them about their rights and liberties as citizens, the 
political virtues, and how to participate in the political decision-making processes of their 
society. Such classes differ from those that aim to teach students to be ethically autonomous. 
The latter kind of classes would encourage students to reflect critically on their 
comprehensive beliefs and values, including their religious ones, as well as those of other 
students. 
 
A pedagogic strategy for teaching students how to be politically autonomous—in particular, 
how to interact with others on the basis of civic respect—is described by Davis and Neufeld 
(2007). Students would participate in formal debates concerning a range of fundamental 
political issues. Such issues could be both historical (concerning, say, pivotal constitutional 
issues in the history of their county) and contemporary in nature (regarding distributive 
justice, marriage, physician-assisted suicide, abortion, alternative electoral systems, and the 
like). After explaining to students that they live in a society characterized by persistent 
disagreement over a wide range of religious and moral questions, the rules of the debate 
would be introduced. The key rule would be that students defend their positions concerning 
fundamental political issues with public reasons. Positions defended without sufficient public 
reasons would be ruled inadmissible. Students would be encouraged to rise on ‘points of 
order’ in order to help them identify arguments that violate the duty of civility. (For instance, 
an argument offered in support of same-sex marriage based exclusively on utilitarian 
considerations would be ruled inadmissible; an argument that appealed to the free and equal 
status of citizens, in contrast, would be admissible.) Through their participation in such 
debates, students would learn how to employ public reasons when deciding fundamental 
political questions. (But these debates need not exclude comprehensive doctrines 
altogether—recall Rawls’s proviso (see §I.e.). Hence students could provide non-public 
reasons for their positions so long as they also provide sufficient public reasons.) 
 
Such exercises would teach students how to exercise political autonomy without necessarily 
exposing their comprehensive beliefs and values to rational scrutiny. Davis and Neufeld 
(2007) concede that some students may choose to scrutinize their comprehensive doctrines 
as a result of their participation in such debates (and similar educational exercises), and 
thereby come to value and exercise comprehensive autonomy. Such broader critical scrutiny, 
though, is not necessary or unavoidable.  
 
III.c. The burdens of judgement argument for the convergence thesis 
 
Eamonn Callan advances another argument for the convergence thesis (1996, 1997). Callan’s 
argument focuses on reasonable persons’ acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
specifically, on Rawls’s idea of the “burdens of judgement” (Rawls 2005: 54-58). Rawls 
sketches six factors—such as the indeterminacy of many of our moral concepts and citizens’ 
diverse life-experiences—that make up these burdens. The idea of the burdens of judgement 
is advanced by Rawls to help explain the fact of reasonable pluralism, that is, why people 
reasoning well nonetheless may come to endorse different comprehensive doctrines.  
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Rawls’s distinction between political and comprehensive autonomy can be seen to be 
“bogus,” according to Callan, “once we reflect on the educational task of securing active 
acceptance of the burdens of judgement” (Callan 1996: 21). An education designed to secure 
such ‘active’ acceptance is indistinguishable from an education designed to foster ethical 
autonomy. This is because, Callan contends, “nominal assent to a list of abstractions is not 
enough; the relevant acceptance must rather be an active and onerous psychological 
disposition, pervasively shaping the beliefs we form and the choices we make” (Callan 1996: 
15; see also 1997: 34, 180f, 217f). Callan concludes: “the psychological attributes that 
constitute an active acceptance of the burdens […], such as the capacity and inclination to 
subject received ethical ideas to critical scrutiny, also constitute a recognizable ideal of ethical 
autonomy” (Callan 1996: 21). Hence educating students to actively accept the burdens of 
judgement—as part of educating them to be reasonable persons—amounts to educating 
them to be ethically autonomous. 
 
III.d. Against the burdens of judgement argument 
 
In presenting the idea of the burdens of judgement, Rawls denies that it requires that citizens 
become “hesitant and uncertain, much less sceptical, about […] [their] own beliefs” (Rawls 
2005: 63). Drawing on recent work in epistemology on peer disagreement, Fabienne Peter 
(2013) defends a view similar to Rawls’s concerning the relation between acceptance of the 
fact of reasonable pluralism and citizens’ confidence in the truth of their comprehensive 
doctrines. On the question of how to teach students to become reasonable persons, Kyla 
Ebels-Duggan (2013) proposes that students can be taught to accept the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, and acknowledge that other comprehensive doctrines can be endorsed by 
reasonable persons, without also teaching them to question or doubt the truth of their own 
comprehensive doctrines. Davis and Neufeld (2007: 60-67) explicitly defend Rawls’s modest 
interpretation of what acceptance of the burdens requires of citizens; they use possible 
lessons on the history of religious conflicts to defend their view with respect to educating 
students about the fact of reasonable pluralism. (See also Edenberg 2016.)  
 
Even if Callan’s interpretation of the burdens of judgement is correct, though, political 
liberals could respond by claiming that students do not need to be taught to accept the 
burdens in order to become reasonable persons (see Strike 1996 and Wenar 1995). The 
burdens of judgement may not be the only way to explain the fact of reasonable pluralism. So 
long as students learn how to interact with others on the basis of the principle of civic 
respect, including how to use public reasons to decide fundamental political questions, they 
can learn to be reasonable persons. Such a response still requires that students learn how to 
be politically autonomous, but because it does not require the acceptance of the burdens of 
judgement in the way presupposed by Callan, it does not seem to involve the necessary 
cultivation of ethical autonomy. 
 
III.e. The second moral power argument for the convergence thesis 
 
The two arguments for the convergence thesis discussed above focus on teaching students 
how to be reasonable persons. But what about the goal of teaching students to be rational 
persons, specifically, persons with the capacity to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of 
the good? The argument for the convergence thesis advanced by Gina Schouten (2018) rests 
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on the purported instrumental value of autonomy for securing students’ future interests with 
respect to the second moral power. Schouten calls this a ‘student-centered’ argument for the 
convergence thesis, as it has to do with the future ability of all students to live good lives, 
rather than their future roles in promoting and maintaining the justice of their society’s basic 
structure.  
 
Schouten’s argument focuses on what is needed for citizens to exercise effectively their 
rights and resources vis-à-vis their second moral power. Rawls calls the rights and resources 
necessary for citizens to exercise their two moral powers—things such as the basic liberties, 
income and wealth, and so forth—'primary goods’ (Rawls 2001: 57-61). All reasonable 
political conceptions of the justice secure for all citizens (at least) sufficient primary goods 
for them to exercise effectively their two moral powers over the course of their lives. With 
respect to citizens’ second moral power, the primary goods are used to form, revise, and 
pursue conceptions of the good. Basic liberties like liberty of conscience and freedom of 
association, along with resources like education, income, and wealth, enable citizens to 
determine and act upon their plans, commitments, relationships, and the like.  
 
Schouten points out that different conceptions of the good are suitable for the flourishing of 
different people: “There are perfectly good lives that some can live well while others cannot” 
(Schouten 2018: 1090). If this is so, then persons must be able to use the primary goods that 
they have available to them as citizens in order to figure out which conceptions of the good 
have value—are a ‘good fit’—for them. But this capacity, she contends, just is a “basic 
capacity for robust autonomy” (Schouten 2018: 1090). An education for robust 
(comprehensive) autonomy, then, is justified on political grounds as a kind of ‘safeguard’ to 
ensure that all citizens—if necessary—will be able to identify and pursue conceptions of the 
good that are appropriate for them (even if not all citizens will need to do this). The capacity 
for robust autonomy, then, helps ensure that students will not end up living lives that are not 
good fits for them because of factors outside of their control, such as the communities and 
families within which they were raised. (A similar claim is sketched in Brighouse 1994.) 
 
III.f. Against the second moral power argument 
 
Political liberals sympathetic to the Rawlsian position can point out that Schouten’s 
argument fails to distinguish adequately between ‘conceptions of the good’—the concern of 
citizens’ second moral power—and ‘comprehensive doctrines.’ Some political liberals do not 
distinguish clearly between these ideas (e.g., Nussbaum 2011). In Rawls’s later writings on 
political liberalism, though, these ideas play distinct roles. A conception of the good is not 
itself a comprehensive doctrine. Rather, “[t]he elements of such a conception are normally 
set within, and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrines in the light of which the various ends and aims are ordered and understood” 
(Rawls 2001: 19). So, for instance, two people might endorse conceptions of the good that 
include artistic excellence and rich family relationships. Yet one person might interpret this 
conception from within a Jewish perspective while the other does so from within a utilitarian 
perspective. Consequently, their understandings of these elements will be quite different. 
 
This distinction threatens Schouten’s argument. Citizens who adhere to different 
comprehensive doctrines often will exercise their second moral power in quite different ways, 
according to different evaluative criteria and drawing on different resources. For instance, 
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the evaluative criteria and resources that a devout Catholic will employ when deliberating 
about which life-plan to pursue will be quite different from those employed by a secular 
humanist—among other things, faith and the pronouncements of relevant religious 
authorities will play a role in the former’s deliberations that they do not in those of the latter. 
The exercise of the second moral power, then, does not seem to require the exercise of 
robust autonomy any more than it seems to require the use of faith—the appropriate roles 
of robust autonomy and faith in citizens’ exercises of their second moral power are shaped by 
their respective comprehensive doctrines. Of course, citizens are free to change their 
comprehensive doctrines and students must be taught “that liberty of conscience exists in 
their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime” (Rawls 2005: 199). But learning these 
things does not require more than learning to understand and exercise political autonomy. 
Schouten’s argument, then, arguably presupposes a comprehensive liberal interpretation of 
what exercising the second moral power necessarily involves. 
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
This chapter outlined some of the main arguments in support of and against the 
convergence thesis. Opponents of the convergence thesis hold that Rawls is correct in 
claiming that teaching political autonomy requires ‘less’ than teaching ethical autonomy. 
Consequently, opponents of the convergence thesis conclude that, ceteris paribus, the kind 
of citizenship education required by political liberalism is compatible with a range of 
educational options for students and families that reflect the reasonable pluralism of their 
societies. In other words, opponents of the convergence thesis generally are sympathetic to 
forms of educational choice for families that accommodate citizens’ diverse comprehensive 
doctrines while at the same time ensuring that all students learn how to become rational and 
reasonable persons (see Davis and Neufeld 2007, Ebels-Duggan 2013, and Edenberg 2016). 
In contrast, defenders of the convergence thesis, because they contend that all students need 
to learn to become ethically autonomous, generally are less sympathetic to any 
decentralization of citizenship educational requirements, at least with respect to curriculum 
content and pedagogy. These are general tendencies, however, as political liberals who agree 
with Rawls readily acknowledge that in certain social circumstances—say, in societies 
threatened by instability, or that suffer from class or race inequality and segregation—
securing political justice and legitimacy may require that students share schools and 
curriculum irrespective of their wishes or those of their parents (see Davis and Neufeld 2007, 
Neufeld 2013).  
 
The political liberal conception of full political autonomy, and the role of public reason with 
respect to the realization of that conception, can be interpreted as an account of how a 
version of Rousseau’s ideal of a self-governing citizenry might be realized in contemporary 
pluralist societies. A pluralist society in which citizens are equal co-sovereigns is a ‘realistic 
utopia’ (Rawls 2001). Realizing the political liberal version of this ideal has significant 
educational implications. Students must be taught to be capable of being reasonable and 
rational persons. Whether such an education necessarily involves teaching students a form of 
comprehensive autonomy has been debated since the publication of Political Liberalism—and 
continues to be debated by political and educational theorists. 
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